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Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction
Christian W. Bach? and Conrad Heilmann??
Abstract. We analyze the sequential structure of dynamic games with
perfect information. A three-stage account is proposed, that specifies set-
up, reasoning and play stages. Accordingly, we define a player as a set
of agents corresponding to these three stages. The notion of agent con-
nectedness is introduced into a type-based epistemic model. Agent con-
nectedness measures the extent to which agents’ choices are sequentially
stable. Thus describing dynamic games allows to more fully understand
strategic interaction over time. In particular, we provide sufficient con-
ditions for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness. Also,
our framework makes explicit that the epistemic independence assump-
tion involved in backward induction reasoning is stronger than usually
presumed, and makes accessible multiple-self interpretations for dynamic
games.
1 Introduction
Dynamic games model sequential strategic interaction. The standard extensive
form models dynamic games as trees, but does not further explicate the se-
quential dimension. The structure of the game, the players, their reasoning and
strategies are implicitly assumed to remain stable throughout the whole game.
In particular, the reasoning is supposed to occur before the game and to apply
to the entire duration of the game. However, local deviations from strategies are
relevant for the dynamics of sequential interaction. More specifically, agents may
depart from the strategy of their respective player, thus contradicting the idea
that agents act according to instructions. Here, we perceive of a player as a set
of agents and introduce the notion of agent connectedness to capture the extent
of sequential stability of players. In our account, high agent connectedness char-
acterizes an agent’s compliance with a player and low agent connectedness an
agent’s deviation. Precisely such properties of agents are central to backward in-
duction, since players need to be able to entertain deviating moves by opponents’
agents in hypothetical reasoning. Indeed, here we provide sufficient conditions
for backward induction in terms of agent connectedness.
In a general sense, we amend the representation of a dynamic game by three
sequential stages. In the set-up stage, the game structure and the players’ utilities
are determined. Then, in the reasoning stage, the players deliberate about the
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2game, their opponents and choose their strategies. Finally, in the play stage,
the players’ agents act at their respective decision nodes. Relative to these three
sequential stages, a player is defined as a set of agents, namely the set-up agent,
the reasoning agent and the game agents. We also amend the notion of strategy
such that its use in the stages can be discussed separately, introducing the notion
of initial strategy in the reasoning stage and actual strategy in the play stage.
This three-stage account enables us to make explicit the sequential stability
assumptions inherent in dynamic games. Also, the framework can be used to
relax such assumptions locally.
The reasoning of players in games is usually described by epistemic models.
Here, we extend a type-based epistemic model of dynamic games with an initial
strategy function by means of which the connectedness of each agent to his
respective player can be expressed. In particular, the notion of connectedness
between a player’s reasoning agent and his game agents is formally introduced to
capture the assumption of sequential strategic stability, i.e. compliance with the
initial strategy. According to this definition, an agent is either high-connected
if he acts in line with the initial strategy or low-connected otherwise. Hence,
beliefs about the connectedness of opponents’ agents enters the belief space as
an additional epistemic feature. Applying this framework, sufficient conditions
for backward induction are obtained by explaining surprise information with
low-connectedness of the deviating agent. Rather than revising the belief in
an opponent’s rationality, a supposedly irrational move of one of his agents
at a preceding decision node is accommodated by belief revision on the high-
connectedness of that agent, which, in turn, separates that supposedly irrational
agent from the remaining agents of the respective opponent.
Various substantial interpretations of our framework become available. In-
terpreting sequence temporally, the three stages in a dynamic game reflect a
player as existing over time: initially, a player assigns utilities to possible out-
comes, subsequently chooses a strategy and at later points in time, he actually
plays. In fact, players existing over time can be interpreted as multiple-selves
and their agents as selves. Hence, theories of personal identity over time can
be used to describe agent connectedness as intrapersonal connectedness in the
multiple-self, with such features as degree of continuity of psychological features,
memory or sympathy. Farther, the interpretation of our framework unveils strong
assumptions implicit in the principle of epistemic independence which underlies
any foundational argument for backward induction. Indeed, an observed surprise
must never induce a belief revision on any intrapersonal connectedness of game
agents at any later points in the game. Finally, our framework can be applied to
the backward induction paradoxes by providing probabilities for future deviation
of agents.
To illustrate our framework, consider the dynamic game of perfect informa-
tion given by the extensive form given in Figure 1.
Such games are commonly solved by backward induction as follows. At Alice’s
second decision node, her unique optimal choice is f . Given this choice of Alice,
Bob’s unique optimal action at his decision node is d. Given the unique opti-
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Fig. 1.
mal choices of Alice at her second decision node and Bob at his decision node,
Alice picks a at her first decision node. The backward induction strategy pro-
file (af, d) thus obtains. Note that Bob has to entertain the possibility of Alice
having deviated from her backward inductive strategy when determining the
choice for his decision node. Even though Alice could not have complied with
her backward inductive strategy, Bob is assumed to think that Alice will nev-
ertheless act in accordance with backward induction later on and hence to play
the backward inductive move himself at his decision node. Accounting for the
surprise that Alice has played b while still maintaining that she will play d is
vital in making backward induction reasoning work. Usually, an assumption of
epistemic independence is used to exclude any influence of such deviating be-
havior on expectations about Alice’s future behavior. In our account, surprise
information is explained with low agent connectedness of the agent governing
Alice’s first decision node. Since low agent connectedness can be interpreted by
a multiple-self model of personal identity over time, player Alice can be un-
derstood as such a multiple-self. Accordingly, the deviating behavior of Alice’s
first agent can be explained as exhibiting low intrapersonal connectedness. For
instance, such low intrapersonal connectedness can occur due to a breakdown
of psychological features, memory or sympathy between the self at Alice’s first
decision node and her other selves. Such a more detailed description of dynamics
allows us to more fully understand strategic interaction over time. In particular,
the essence of backward induction can be elucidated.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces our three-stage account of dy-
namic games, and defines a player as a set of agents. Section 3 describes players’
reasoning by extending a type-based epistemic model of dynamic games with
agent connectedness. Then, Section 4 gives sufficient conditions for backward in-
duction in terms of agent connectedness. Section 5 discusses some interpretative
issues of our framework, with particular emphasis on a multiple-self interpreta-
tion of a player. Finally, Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2 Modeling Dynamic Games
Here, we make explicit the inherent sequential structure of dynamic games by a
three-stage account that distinguishes between set-up, reasoning and play stages.
Farther, a player is defined as a set of agents corresponding to these three stages,
4namely set-up agent, reasoning agent and game agents. Two notions of strategy
are tailored to the reasoning and play stage, respectively. Our three-stage ac-
count unveils a sequential stability assumption implicit in the standard model
of dynamic games.
Since Kuhn (1953), dynamic strategic interaction has commonly been mod-
eled by the so-called extensive form which represents a game as a tree.
Definition 1. An extensive form structure with perfect information is a tuple
Γ = (X,Z,E, x0, I,m, (ui)i∈I), where
– X is a finite set of non-terminal nodes, specifying decision nodes,
– Z is a finite set of terminal nodes, specifying the different situations in which
the game may end,
– E is a finite set of directed edges (x, y) ∈ X× (X ∪Z), specifying the choices
for the players, where (x, y) moves the game from x to y,
– x0 is the unique root of the tree and called initial node,
– I is a finite set of players, where | I |> 1,
– m : X \Z → I is the move function assigning to every non-terminal node the
choosing player, where Xi denotes the set of all x ∈ X such that m(x) = i,
– ui : Z → R is player i’s utility function assigning to every terminal node
z ∈ Z a utility ui(z).
The extensive form can be interpreted as a set-up procedure for modeling a
dynamic game.1 First, the structure of the game has to be specified, i.e. all of
its possible situations, outcomes at final situations, and rules are formalized by
the sets X, Z and E, respectively. Then, a particular set of players determines
the decision-makers in the game and the corresponding contingent situations
where they act is given by the move function m. In a final step, each player
has to consider all possible outcomes of the game and assign cardinal utilities
to them in line with his preferences. To make explicit this procedural character
inherent in the extensive form, we call the course of fixing the model set-up stage
of a dynamic game. Once the game is fixed, the players can reason about it for
decision-making purposes and thereafter the game is actually played.
A further basic ingredient when modeling dynamic games is the notion of
strategy, which is considered the object of choice for the players. A strategy
specifies an action for each contingency that might possibly arise for the respec-
tive player.
Definition 2. Let Γ be an extensive form structure with perfect information,
i ∈ I some player and Ai(xi) ⊆ E the set of edges departing from xi ∈ Xi. A
strategy for i is a function si : Xi →
⋃
xi∈Xi Ai(xi) such that si(xi) ∈ Ai(xi)
for all xi ∈ Xi.
1 Note that we restrict attention to dynamic games with perfect information, i.e. games
in which all players, whenever they have to choose, know exactly the choices made
by their opponents until then.
5According to the standard view, a strategy specifies an action for each con-
tingency that might possibly arise for the respective player and hence can be
interpreted as his disposition to act at each of his decision nodes. We call such
a choice plan an actual strategy since it refers to the contingent actions of the
players when actually playing the game. However, also before the game is played,
players determine strategies based on their hypothetical reasoning. Such objects
resulting from the players’ reasoning and being fixed before play are called ini-
tial strategies and are formally defined in the next section. Note that actual
strategies can differ from initial strategies.
After the set-up stage, a player reasons about his opponents as well as the
fixed game, and decides on a complete contingent choice plan for the game as a
result of this reasoning. We call this process the reasoning stage of a dynamic
game and the player’s ensuing hypothetical choice plan is his initial strategy.
Note that although coming after the set-up stage, the reasoning stage is prior
to the actual play of the game. The introduction of the reasoning stage thus
explicitly separates hypothetical plans from actual choices.
After the set-up and reasoning stages the game is actually played and all
contingent situations that may possibly arise in the game are represented in the
extensive form by a player’s set of decision nodes. We assume that each such
node is governed by an agent of the player and call the actual playing phase of
the dynamic game the play stage. With the game structure and initial strategy
being fixed by the prior two stages, the play stage determines the strategy profile
that is actually played as well as the corresponding outcome and utilities for the
players. Hence, our account distinguishes between three stages of a dynamic
game: the set-up stage, the reasoning stage and the play stage.
Farther, note how our three-stage view on dynamic games makes use of the
notion of player. Accordingly, two distinguishable tasks are performed by a player
before the play stage: utilities have to be assigned to outcomes in the set-up
stage, followed by the choice of an initial strategy in the reasoning stage. During
the play stage each of the decision nodes specifies a distinguishable task to be
handled by one agent, respectively. In order to be able to discern the acting
entities of the different stages, we understand the player as consisting of a set-up
agent, a reasoning agent and game agents. Formally, a player is defined as the
set of his agents.
Definition 3. Let Γ be an extensive form structure with perfect information.
A player i ∈ I in Γ is defined as a set of agents i = {αis, αir, αi1, αi2, ..., αim},
where | Xi |= m ∈ N, and αis is called set-up agent, αir is called reasoning agent,
and all other agents αij are called game agents, each corresponding to a unique
decision node xi ∈ Xi.
The preceding definition of a player as a set of agents makes formally explicit
the different tasks to be performed by a player in a dynamic game, related to
the three different stages.
Note that our account of dynamic games makes transparent their sequential
structure. Yet, a stability assumption lurks implicitly in the standard extensive
6form model. Despite the sequential character of dynamic games, no changes in
the game’s ingredients, utility assignments or choice prescriptions by the initial
strategy is admitted during the dynamic interaction. In other words, any object
fixed in the two pre-play stages, once determined, remains rigid until the end of
the game. The basic game ingredients - decision nodes, strategy sets, possible
outcomes, player sets and utility assignments - are assumed to remain stable
throughout reasoning and play. In particular, invariant utilities reflect the as-
sumption of stable preferences for all agents. Moreover, the deliberation of the
reasoning agent of a player is supposed to apply to all game agents, who are all
required to adhere to the initial strategy. Hence, any dynamics concerning the
game structure as well as concerning the player are excluded by the standard
extensive form model of dynamic games. While it may seem plausible to keep
the game structure fixed given an underlying dynamic game to be modeled, the
suspension of any dynamics concerning the player represents a rather strong
assumption within the standard model. The introduction of three stages rele-
vant to a dynamic game allows us to explicitly endorse or weaken the stability
assumption with respect to deviation from pre-play reasoning.
The idea of understanding a player as a set of agents is now illustrated with
the extensive form depicted in Figure 1. In addition to the game agents at their
respective decision nodes, both players Alice and Bob have two further agents
that determine their utilities and strategies before play, corresponding to the
set-up and reasoning stage, respectively. The two players can thus be formalized
as sets Alice = {Alices, Alicer, Alice1, Alice3} and Bob = {Bobs, Bobr, Bob2}.
Actual choice of a player is then described by a strategy, each component of
which is determined by the respective game agent in charge. For example, the
actual strategy profile (be, d) signifies that Alice1 chooses b at her first decision
node, then Bob2 picks d at his decision node and Alice3 selects e at her second
decision node. However, the initial strategies of the reasoning agents could be
different. For instance, Alicer might have chosen bf prior to play. Note that in
this example, a common index is used for both players to identify the position
of their agents in the game tree and to reflect its sequential structure. More
complicated game trees such as ones with parallel nodes governed by different
agents of one player can then still be given some sequential order, relative to
the structure of the game tree. Farther, game agents assigned to decision nodes
that are excluded by actual play can be interpreted as inactive game agents.
Also, it is possible to conceive of a player as having inactive agents at opponent
decision nodes, and to hence interpret the player as a decision-maker over time
with inactive agents at points in the game where no game agent acts for him. For
instance, the set representing Alice would then be amended with the inactive
agent Alice2, and the set representing Bob would be amended with the inactive
agents Bob1 and Bob3, where the inactive agents correspond to decision nodes
which are assigned to opponent game agents, respectively.
Our three-stage account of dynamic games proposed in this section makes
explicit the sequential character of dynamic games and the stability assumptions
already implicit in the standard extensive form model. A player is conceived of
7as a set of agents relative to the three sequential stages, making explicit that
different agents of a player act in distinct sequential situations before and during
play. Section 5 discusses various interpretations that can be used in the context
of this account. For instance, the sequential structure of dynamic games can be
understood as temporal, players can be perceived as persons or multiple-selves
and initial strategies can be viewed as intentions of the respective players. The
next section proposes an epistemic model for the reasoning stage of dynamic
games and formalizes the notion of initial strategy.
3 Extending Type-based Interactive Epistemology
Interactive epistemology, also called epistemic game theory when applied to
games, provides an abstract framework to formalize epistemic notions such as be-
lief and knowledge. This rather recent field of research was initiated by Aumann
(1976) and first adopted in the context of games by Tan and Werlang (1988).
The fundamental problem addressed is the description of the players’ choices in
a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions. Epistemic game theory
builds on the basic intuition that a player has to reason about the other players.
Before choosing his strategy, he must form a belief about what his opponents
will do. However, in order to so, he also needs to form a belief about what the
others believe that their opponents will do. Similarly, any higher-order beliefs
about his opponents are relevant to the player’s choice. In order to formally rep-
resent players’ reasoning about each other, an epistemic model is added to the
analysis of a game. Here, we follow the type-based approach to epistemic game
theory, according to which different epistemic states are encapsulated in the no-
tion of type. More precisely, a set of types is assigned to every player, where
each player’s type induces a belief on the opponents’ choices and types. Thus
any higher-order belief can be derived from a given type. The notion of type was
originally introduced by Harsanyi (1967-68) in the specific context of incomplete
information but can actually be generalized to any interactive uncertainty. A
recent survey of type-based interactive epistemology is provided by Siniscalchi
(2008). Here, we extend the standard type-based epistemic model with the new
notion of initial strategy.
Before our epistemic model can be defined, one further notion is needed.
Letting Sj denote the set of all strategies of player j, a strategy sj ∈ Sj is said
to avoid a given decision node x ∈ X, if there exists some decision node x∗ ∈ X
on the unique path from the initial node x0 to x, for which sj assigns an off-
path action. The set Sj(x) ⊆ Sj then denotes all strategies of player j that do
not avoid node x. An extended epistemic model for dynamic games can now be
defined as follows.
Definition 4. Let Γ be a finite extensive form structure with perfect informa-
tion. An extended epistemic model of Γ is a tuple MΓ = (Ti, βi, ιi)i∈I , where
Ti is a finite set of types for player i; βi : Ti× (Xi ∪xo)→ ∆(×j∈I\{i}(Sj ×Tj))
assigns to every type ti ∈ Ti and decision node xi ∈ Xi, a probability distribution
8on the set of opponents’ strategy-type pairs, where βi(ti, xi) ∈ ∆(×j∈i\{i}(Sj(x)×
Tj)) for all x ∈ Xi ∪ {x0}; ιi : Ti → Si assigns to every type ti ∈ Ti an initial
strategy.
In the context of our three-stage account of dynamic games, the extended epis-
temic model concerns the reasoning stage. Thus, the deliberation of a player’s
reasoning agent is formalized by the extended epistemic model. In particular,
the reasoning agent is disposed with conditional beliefs of any order at each of
his decision nodes as well as the initial node, via the probability function βi.
Crucially, it is a distinguished feature of our epistemic model that a type does
not only hold conditional beliefs about the opponents’ actual strategies, but
also about the opponents’ initial strategies. Note that the conditional beliefs
of the reasoning agent refer to hypothetical epistemic states of the respective
game agents. Hence, while types and their induced conditional belief hierarchies
model the deliberation process of the reasoning agent, the novel ingredient of
initial strategy is interpreted as the outcome of the player’s reasoning. Farther,
note that the conditional beliefs of a player i at a given node x ∈ X ∪ {x0}
only assign positive probability to opponents’ strategy choices that do not avoid
x. This seems reasonable since otherwise a player would exhibit contradictory
beliefs: although knowing to be at decision node x, he believes that at least one
opponent has chosen a strategy avoiding x and thus excluding it to be reached.
The initial strategy is fixed in the reasoning stage before the play stage, in
which the game is actually played. Choices by the game agents might differ from
the ones prescribed by the reasoning agent’s initial strategy. Since a player is
conceived of as a set of agents by Definition 3, such a behavioral deviation from
the initial strategy raises the problem of connectedness between a player’s game
agents and his reasoning agent. On the basis of the initial strategy function,
we now formally introduce connectedness into our extended epistemic model for
dynamic games.
Definition 5. Let MΓ be an extended epistemic model of an extensive form
structure Γ with perfect information. Further, let ιtii (xi) denote the action that
the initial strategy of type ti ∈ Ti designates for game agent αixi at xi ∈ Xi, let
sαi denote the strategy of i that is actually played and let s
α
i (xi) denote the actual
choice of game agent αixi at xi. The connectedness ci(α
i
xi , s
α
i | ti) of game agent
αixi is defined as
ci(αixi , s
α
i | ti) =
{
high if ιtii (xi) = s
α
i (xi),
low otherwise.
In the above definition, the actual strategy played refers to the actual choices of
the respective player’s game agents at the decision nodes they govern. Initial and
actual strategy are then compared. A game agent is said to be high-connected
if he acts in compliance with the initial strategy and low-connected otherwise.
Connectedness hence both separates and relates sequential parts of the player at
contingent points of the game. Note that the connectedness function expresses a
9behavioral notion as its values are determined by the actual choices of the game
agents, relative to the initial strategy of the reasoning agent. In this context,
the reasoning agent can be seen as the central representative of the player. This
is plausible as the reasoning agent initially chooses a complete strategy that is
intended to apply throughout the game, whereas the game agents only act locally.
Also, stability of the initial strategy and hence equivalence to the actual strategy
is implicitly assumed in the standard extensive form model. In the sequel, we
therefore refer to reasoning agent and player interchangeably.
Moreover, note that the above definition can be generalized to provide a
more realistic interpretation of a player in a dynamic game as a person. For
instance, departing from a purely behavioral notion of connectedness, it is pos-
sible to furnish additional interpretation, such as underlying connectedness of
psychological features, memory and sympathy. In this case, more general formal
definitions of the connectedness function are available. For example, connected-
ness could be defined to be any subset of the real numbers or any countable
or even uncountable abstract set. Also, rather than focusing on the relation be-
tween the reasoning agent and the game agents of a given player, connectedness
between any pair of agents can be considered. Such interpretations are addressed
in Section 5.
In type-based epistemic models, the objects of beliefs are events. Intuitively,
an event states a property concerning the model’s uncertainty space. Within
the context of games, examples of events are “Alice plays strategy bf”, “Bob
is rational” and “Bob believes at the initial node that Alice’s agents are high-
connected”. Formally, events are simply sets of types. More precisely, a set E ⊆⋃
i∈I Ti of types is called event. The belief of some player i at some node x ∈
Xi ∪ {x0} in some event E can then be modeled by projecting βi(ti, xi) on T−i,
denoted as βi(ti, xi | T−i). Similarly, player i’s belief at some node x ∈ Xi∪{x0}
on the type of player j ∈ I \ {i} can be obtained by projecting βi(ti, xi) on Tj ,
denoted as βi(ti, xi | Tj). Moreover, player i’s belief at some node x ∈ Xi ∪{x0}
on player j’s strategy-type pair can be extracted by projecting βi(ti, xi) on
Sj × Tj , denoted as βi(ti, xi | Sj × Tj). Note that beliefs are events, too and
that indeed any higher-order belief can be represented in a type-based epistemic
model. Given some event, a player’s type specifies conditional belief hierarchies
at each of his decision nodes. Epistemic states are thus local and concern the
respective node-governing agent of the player. Yet they are hypothetical in the
sense of belonging to the reasoning agent when deliberating before play about
what his game agents would know were their respective nodes be reached.
For the purpose of formalizing rationality in our framework, let ui(ιi(ti), βi(ti) |
xi) denote player i’s expected utility starting at node xi of playing the relevant
part of strategy ιi(ti) given his belief at xi about the opponents’ strategies.
Definition 6. Let MΓ be an epistemic model of an extensive form structure
Γ with perfect information and i ∈ I some player. A type ti ∈ Ti is rational
if ti ∈ Ri = {ti ∈ Ti : ui(ιi(ti), βi(ti) | xi) ≥ ui(si, βi(ti) | xi) for all si ∈
Si and for all xi ∈ Xi}.
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Accordingly, a type of a player is rational if his initial strategy maximizes his
expected utility at every decision node in the game. Rationality is hence under-
stood as a notion relative to the result of a player’s reasoning, since it is precisely
the outcome of his reasoning that reflects his attitude towards the interactive
situation he is involved in. Note that our notion of rationality proposed here is
weaker than the standard one, since the latter requires actual choice to be opti-
mal throughout the tree while the former only concerns initial choice. A player
can thus be rational in our sense while still actually acting irrationally in the
standard sense. As an illustration of this observation, consider the game given
in Figure 1. Suppose Alice believes that Bob chooses d and her reasoning agent
Alicer hence picks the rational initial strategy af . Nevertheless, Alice1 can still
choose b at her decision node, hence acting irrationally in the standard sense.
As has already been pointed out above, within our extended epistemic frame-
work a player can be perceived as the reasoning agent and his object of choice,
the initial strategy, can be perceived as the result of the reasoning process, for
instance, as his intention or plan of action for the game. A player’s game agents
then actually choose actions at the respective decision nodes, either in line with
the initial strategy of the reasoning agent, or differently. Specific patterns of
relationship between a player or his reasoning agent and his game agents can
be formalized. We call a player i ∈ I high-connected if all of his game agents
are highly connected, i.e. ci(αixi , s
α
i | ti) = high for all αixi ∈ i. In other words,
the game agents of a high-connected player actually choose in complete accor-
dance with his proposed initial strategy. However, it is possible that only some
game agents are highly connected, while others are not. For instance, only game
agents succeeding some particular node might be high-connected. Crucially, be-
lief in different patterns of high-connected game agents can be defined in our
model. For instance, the following condition requires a player to believe in the
high-connectedness of an opponent at all future nodes.
Definition 7. Let MΓ be an epistemic model of an extensive form structure
Γ with perfect information, i ∈ I be some player, and x ∈ Xi ∪ {x0} some
node. A type ti ∈ Ti believes in j’s future-high-connectedness at node x if ti ∈
BHi,j(x) = {ti ∈ Ti : supp(βi(ti, x | Sj × Tj)) ⊆ {(sj , tj) ∈ Sj × Tj : sj(xj) =
ι
tj
j (xj) for all xj ∈ Xj succeeding x}}.
This definition relates a player’s belief on what an opponent is actually play-
ing with the belief about his initial strategy. More generally, our model is also
capable of distinguishing between actual and initial strategy in the reasoning of
players about their respective opponents.
The preceding definitions introduce connectedness of game agents to their
player, conceived of as the reasoning agent, into our extended epistemic frame-
work, which in turn can be used to understand reasoning in strategic interaction
over time. In a first such step, these notions are used in the next section to shed
light on backward induction reasoning in dynamic games with perfect informa-
tion.
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4 Sufficient Conditions for Backward Induction
Backward induction constitutes the standard reasoning method in dynamic games
with perfect information: at each decision node, optimal behavior is determined
by assuming the optimality of choices at all succeeding nodes. Before formally
defining backward induction we restrict attention to generic games with perfect
information.
Definition 8. An extensive form structure Γ with perfect information is called
generic if for every player i ∈ I, for every decision node xi ∈ Xi, for every two
actions ai, a′i ∈ Ai(xi), every two terminal nodes z ∈ Z such that z follows ai
and z′ follows a′i, it holds that ui(z) 6= ui(z′).
Accordingly, any two different choices at a given decision node will always lead
to two distinct utilities for the respective player. It is common to assume generic-
ity when searching for epistemic characterizations of backward induction. Since
genericity implies uniqueness of the backward inductive strategy profile, no am-
biguity arises in determining the actions in line with backward induction at
each node in the tree. This restriction is not severe, since the aim is to unveil
the epistemic states portraying the way of thinking characteristic of backward
inductive reasoning. Genericity avoids the introduction of somewhat arbitrary
criteria for ties that would divert from the essential properties of the players’
reasoning required for backward induction to obtain.
Farther note that backward induction can only be defined for finite games, as
possible end points of the game are required for the backward inductive process
to begin. Finiteness is already implicit in our definition of the extensive form.
In order to facilitate the formal expression of backward induction, the decision
nodes are classified according to their maximal distance from an end point i.e.
a terminal node of the game, independent from any closer terminal nodes.
Definition 9. Let Γ be an extensive form structure with perfect information and
x ∈ ⋃i∈I Xi some decision node. Decision node x is called ultimate if x is only
immediately succeeded by terminal nodes; decision node x is called pre-ultimate
if x is only immediately succeeded by ultimate decision nodes or by ultimate
decision nodes and terminal nodes; decision node x is called pre-pre-ultimate if
x is only immediately succeeded by pre-ultimate decision nodes or by pre-ultimate
decision nodes and ultimate decision nodes or by pre-ultimate decision nodes and
terminal nodes or by pre-ultimate decision nodes and ultimate decision nodes and
terminal nodes; etc. Decision node x is called initial node if x = x0.
It is now possible to define backward induction for generic finite dynamic
games of perfect information as follows.
Definition 10. Let Γ be a generic extensive form structure with perfect infor-
mation, i ∈ I some player and xi ∈ Xi some decision node of i. The unique
backward inductive choice bi(xi) ∈ Ai(xi) at xi is determined as follows: if xi
is an ultimate node, then bi(xi) is the unique action that maximizes i’s utility
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at xi, and if xi is pre-ultimate node, then bi(xi) is the unique action at xi that
maximizes i’s utility at xi given backward inductive actions at all decision nodes
succeeding xi, etc. Player i’s unique backward inductive strategy bi ∈ Si assigns
to each of i’s decision node xi ∈ Xi the respective unique backward inductive
action bi(xi) ∈ Ai(xi).
It is natural for epistemic game theory to search for epistemic requirements
that induce the players to choose their backward inductive strategies. Indeed,
various different sufficient conditions for backward induction have been proposed
in the literature, which are reviewed, unified and compared by Perea (2007). Far-
ther, note that the emphasis lies on what requirements are needed for a player to
actually choose his backward inductive strategy and hence to make transparent
the complete reasoning underlying backward induction. The genuinely different
question of what epistemic conditions are needed to get the backward induc-
tive outcome is addressed in, for instance, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and
Brandenburger et al (2008). Here, we give an epistemic characterization of the
backward inductive strategy profile in terms of connectedness.
Some more epistemic concepts need to be introduced before formal conditions
for backward induction can be stated.
Definition 11. Let MΓ be an epistemic model of an extensive form structure
Γ with perfect information, and i ∈ I some player. A type ti ∈ Ti structurally
believes in his opponents’ rationality if ti ∈ SBRi = {ti ∈ Ti : supp(βi(ti, x |
Tj)) ⊆ Rj , for all x ∈ Xi ∪ {x0}, for all j ∈ I \ {i}}.
According to the above definition, at the beginning of the game as well as at
any of his decision nodes, a player believes that all of his opponents are rational
i.e. choose a rational initial strategy.
Iterating structural belief in rationality gives the nested epistemic notion of
common structural belief in rationality.
Definition 12. LetMΓ be an epistemic model of an extensive form structure Γ
with perfect information and i ∈ I some player. A type ti ∈ Ti expresses common
structural belief in rationality if ti ∈ CSBRi = {ti ∈ Ti : ti ∈ SBRki for all k ≥
1}, where SBR1i = SBRi, and SBRk+1i = {ti ∈ Ti : supp(βi(ti, x | Tj)) ⊆
SBRkj , for all x ∈ Xi ∪ {x0}, for all j ∈ I \ {i}}, for all k ≥ 1.
Intuitively, the event of player i satisfying common structural belief in rationality
describes the situation in which i initially as well as at each of his decision nodes,
believes that his opponents initially choose rationally, i.e. optimal everywhere in
the game tree, initially as well as at each of his decision nodes, believes that his
opponents initially as well as at each of their decision nodes believe that their
opponents initially choose rationally i.e. optimal everywhere in the game tree,
etc. In other words, player i always believes that his opponents choose optimal
initial strategies, always believes that every opponent always believes that every
other player always chooses an optimal initial strategy, etc. Observe that due
to our weaker notion of rationality in Definition 6, it is always possible to de-
fine common structural belief in rationality in our epistemic model, contrary to
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impossibility results, such as by Reny (1992) and (1993), concerning epistemic
models with standard rationality. While it is usually not distinguished between
initial and actual choice, common structural belief in rationality cannot be gen-
erally defined in standard epistemic structures. However, our model is capable
of admitting that a player believes that an opponent initially chooses rationally,
while at the same time entertaining the belief that the same opponent will ac-
tually choose irrationally at some points in the game and thus not carry out
the rational strategy of his respective reasoning agent. In our model, a player
can reason about both the reasoning as well as the actual play of his opponents.
In this context note that Perea (2008) provides an epistemic model in which
common structural belief in standard rationality is generally made possible by
allowing a player to revise his beliefs about his opponents’ utilities during the
game, while assuming the respective player’s utilities to be constant. As an il-
lustration of the permanent feasibility of common structural belief in rationality
in our framework, consider the dynamic game given in Figure 1. Suppose satis-
fying common structural belief in rationality, Bob believes at the beginning of
the game as well as at his decision node that Alice initially rationally chooses
strategy af . It is then possible that Bob believes at his decision node that Alice
actually chooses a strategy different from af , i.e. that game agent Alice1 has
picked b and game agent Alice3, for instance, will pick e, while still maintaining
his belief in Alicer’s rational choice of the initial strategy af .
Farther, note that games are epistemically investigated from a perspective
which is completely that of a single player. Even nested belief notions are defined
from the viewpoint of a specific player. Understanding interactive epistemology
as a theory of reasoning prior to choice, this stance seems natural, since any rea-
soning process takes place entirely within the reasoning individual, represented
here by the reasoning agent.
Connectedness is now used to define the nested epistemic notion of forward
belief in future-high-connectedness.
Definition 13. Let MΓ be an epistemic model of an extensive form structure
Γ with perfect information and i ∈ I some player. A type ti ∈ Ti expresses
forward belief in future-high-connectedness if ti ∈ FBHi = {ti ∈ Ti : ti ∈
BHki (x), for all k ≥ 1, for all x ∈ Xi ∪ {x0}}, where BH1i (x) = {ti ∈ Ti : ti ∈
BHi,j for all j ∈ I \ {i}}, and BHk+1i (x) = {ti ∈ Ti : supp(βi(ti, x | Tj)) ⊆
BHkj (xj), for all j ∈ I \ {i}, for all xj ∈ Xj such that xj follows x}, for all
x ∈ Xi ∪ {x0}, and for all k ≥ 1.
According to forward belief in future-high-connectedness, a player always be-
lieves that his opponents’ agents are highly connected at all succeeding nodes,
that his opponents believe at all succeeding nodes that their opponents-agents
are highly connected at all respectively succeeding nodes, etc. Observe that this
epistemic condition implies that at any possible situation in the game, the player
believes that any opponent agent at a succeeding decision node is highly con-
nected and hence acts in accordance with the respective initial strategy of his
player.
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Farther, note generally that requiring forward belief in some event E is a
considerably weaker epistemic condition than common structural belief in E.
Accordingly, a theorem only requiring forward belief in some particular event
and not common structural belief is strengthened. To see that common structural
belief in E is stronger than forward belief in E, consider a decision node xi
succeeding some node xj . According to the former epistemic condition i believes
at xi that opponent j believes E at xj , while the latter concept of forward belief
in E does not put any restrictions on what i believes at xi what j believes
at any preceding decision node, in particular not whether j believes E at xj .
Intuitively, the strength of common structural belief derives from the fact that
it concerns any decision node, including respectively preceding ones, relative to a
given decision node. In contrast, forward belief concerns only succeeding decision
nodes, given a particular decision node.
It is now possible to formulate epistemic conditions for backward induction
in terms of connectedness.
Theorem 1. Let MΓ be an epistemic model of a generic extensive form struc-
ture Γ with perfect information and i ∈ I some player. If ti ∈ Ti such that
ti ∈ Ri ∩ CSBRi ∩ FBHi, then ι(ti) = bi.
Proof. Suppose that ti ∈ Ti such that ti ∈ Ri ∩CSBRi ∩ FBHi. We show that
ti initially assigns the backward inductive action to each decision node xi ∈ Xi,
i.e. ι(ti) = bi. Consider a decision node xi ∈ Xi of player i. Suppose that xi is an
ultimate decision node. Then, by rationality of ti, ιtii (xi) = bi(xi). Suppose that
xi is a pre-ultimate decision node. Since ti ∈ FBHi, type ti believes at xi that
every opponent game agent αjxj is high-connected to his respective player j and
hence chooses according to j’s initial strategy at every ultimate decision node
xj succeeding xi. As ti ∈ CSBRi, he also believes at xi in j’s rationality i.e.
that j’s initial strategy is rational. Hence, ti believes that every high-connected
opponent game agent αjxj does indeed choose rationally at every xj succeeding
xi, and thus picks the unique backward inductive action bj(xj) there. Therefore,
the unique optimal action for i at xi is the backward inductive one and rational-
ity of ti ensures that ιtii (xi) = bi(xi). Now suppose that xi is a pre-pre-ultimate
decision node. Since ti ∈ FBHi, type ti believes at xi that every opponent
game agent αjxj is high-connected to his respective player j and hence chooses
according to j’s initial strategy at every decision node xj succeeding xi. Note
that every opponent decision node xj succeeding xi is either pre-ultimate or ul-
timate. Suppose that xj is ultimate. As ti ∈ CSBRi ∩FBHi, type ti believes at
xi in j’s rationality i.e. that j initially chooses rationally, as well as that every
high-connected opponent game agent αjxj does indeed choose rationally at every
ultimate decision node xj , and thus picks the unique backward inductive action
bj(xj) there. Suppose that xj is pre-ultimate. Since ti ∈ FBHi, type ti believes
at xi that at any immediately succeeding opponent decision node xj , the respec-
tive opponent j believes that his opponents’ game agents are high-connected,
and thus act in accordance with their respective player’s initial strategy, at all
succeeding ultimate decision nodes. Also, by ti ∈ CSBRi, type ti believes at xi
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that his opponents believe at all succeeding nodes in their opponents’ rationality
i.e. that their opponents have initially chosen rationally. Hence, ti believes at xi
that at any immediately succeeding opponent decision node xj , the respective
opponent j believes that his opponents’ high-connected game agents play ratio-
nally at every ultimate decision node succeeding xj . Moreover, by ti ∈ CSBRi,
type ti also believes at xi in j’s rationality, i.e. in a rational initial strategy
choice of j. Since ti ∈ FBHi, it then follows that he believes at xi that every
high-connected game agent αjxj does indeed choose rationally at the respective
pre-ultimate decision node xj . But as ti believes at xi that j believes at xj that
j’s opponents choose the backward inductive actions at all ultimate decision
nodes succeeding xj , in fact ti believes at xi that αjxj picks his unique backward
inductive action bj(xj) at xj . Therefore, since ti believes at xi that at any suc-
ceeding decision node the respective opponent game agent chooses the backward
inductive action, the unique optimal action for i himself at xi is the backward
inductive one and ιtii (xi) = bi(xi) obtains by rationality of ti. By induction,
it follows that at any xi ∈ Xi, type ti believes that his opponent game agents
choose the unique backward inductive action at any xj succeeding xi, and hence,
being rational, ti initially assigns the unique backward inductive choice to each
of his decision nodes, i.e. ιi(ti) = bi. uunionsq
In our enriched epistemic framework, the preceding theorem provides a foun-
dation for backward induction in terms of connectedness. Intuitively, common
structural belief in rationality ensures that the respective player always believes
that his opponents initially play rationally i.e. their unique backward inductive
strategies, while at the same time he also always believes that his opponents’
future game agents actually choose accordingly, by forward belief in future-high-
connectedness. Then, i initially chooses his unique backward inductive strategy.
In fact, any surprise information that might arise during play is explained by
low-connectedness of the deviating game agent, maintaining the belief in future-
high-connectedness of all succeeding game agents.
When reasoning about his opponents in the reasoning stage, a player’s rea-
soning agent contemplates both about his opponents’ reasoning as well as their
actual choices. In fact, it is his conclusion on his opponents’ actual choices that
finally matters for the decision problem of the player’s reasoning agent on the
basis of which he then chooses an initial strategy. Conceptually, a type furnished
by an epistemic model captures the complete reasoning of the respective player.
Indeed, the epistemic states and the reasoning of a player coincide. During the
play stage, agents then pick actual choices according to which the dynamic game
unfolds. Importantly, actual decisions need not to be in accordance with the un-
derlying reasoning. For instance, a player might change with regards to properties
of his mental set-up such as psychological, emotional or memory features. These
interpretative issues will be addressed in Section 5.
An epistemic model only prescribes a player’s beliefs and intentions, i.e en-
compasses his reasoning, but it does not prescribe actual choices. Here, our
framework precisely captures this basic idea of an epistemic model by distin-
guishing between initial and actual strategy choice by a reasoning agent and a
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set of game agents, respectively, and explicitly endorses the possibility of change
in a player’s decisions. A player’s decision furnished by our epistemic model
is accurately his initial strategy. Hence, the epistemic foundation for backward
induction provided by Theorem 1 does concern a player’s initial and not his ac-
tual strategy. However, our framework also permits the formulation of sufficient
conditions for backward induction in terms of actual choice as follows.
Corollary 1. Let MΓ be an epistemic model of a generic extensive form struc-
ture Γ with perfect information. If ci(αixi , s
α
i | ti) = high, for all xi ∈ Xi, and
for all i ∈ I, as well as ti ∈ Ti such that ti ∈ Ri ∩CSBRi ∩FBHi for all i ∈ I,
then sα = b.
Proof. Consider i ∈ I and suppose that ti ∈ Ti such that ti ∈ Ri ∩ CSBRi ∩
FBHi. It follows from Theorem 1 that ιtii (xi) = bi(xi) for all xi ∈ Xi. Since
ci(αixi , s
α
i | ti) = high, for all xi ∈ Xi, each high-connected game agent of
player i will indeed choose the backward inductive action sαi (xi) = bi(xi) at any
xi ∈ Xi, respectively. Therefore, i’s actual backward inductive strategy choice
sαi = bi obtains. uunionsq
Accordingly, the backward inductive strategy profile will be played if each player’s
reasoning agent is rational, expresses common structural belief in rationality
as well as forward belief in future-high-connectedness, and each player’s game
agents are highly connected i.e. actually do carry out their reasoning agent’s
initial strategy. Again note that actual choice is a property of game agents not
of the reasoning agent i.e. the type.
As an illustration of this epistemic foundation of backward induction, con-
sider Bob’s reasoning in the dynamic game given in Figure 1. In order to choose
his initial strategy in the reasoning stage, Bobr hypothetically considers his
game agent Bob2. By forward belief in future-high-connectedness, Bobr believes
at Bob2 that Alice3 will be high-connected and thus play in line with the initial
strategy of her reasoning agent Alicer. Since, by common structural belief in
rationality, he believes Alicer to choose rationally, Bobr believes at Bob2 that
Alicer initially chooses f at her final decision node. Therefore, Bobr believes at
Bob2 that the high-connected Alice3 complies with the initial rational strategy
and thus picks f . Hence, Bobr initially chooses his rational strategy d, as well
as actually in case of Bob2 being high-connected.
Farther observe that our theorem makes explicit a strong principle of epis-
temic independence needed for backward induction: the observation of a deviat-
ing opponent game agent has no influence whatsoever on a player’s beliefs con-
cerning any game agents at succeeding decision nodes, who are still believed to
be highly connected each. Also note that only requiring forward belief in future-
high-connectedness instead of the stronger condition of common structural belief
in future-high-connectedness strengthens our epistemic characterization of back-
ward induction. The epistemic foundation for backward induction in terms of
connectedness provided here is interpreted and discussed in Section 5.
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5 Discussion
5.1 Dynamics
Our extended epistemic framework, which understands players as sets of agents
and models their connectedness, is capable of shedding light on the dynamic
character of dynamic games.
In a general sense, our framework displays the complete sequential structure
underlying the standard extensive form model of dynamic games. According to
our framework, a dynamic game has at least three distinguishable stages: the set-
up stage, the reasoning stage and the play stage. It is thus made explicit that
different agents of a player find themselves in distinct, sequential situations,
such as utility assignments before play, reasoning before play and then play
at different decision nodes. Moreover, explicating the sequential structure of
dynamic games within our framework reveals stability assumptions implicit in
the standard extensive form model. The ingredients of the game, including the
fact that utilities are determined prior to reasoning and actual play as well as
that pre-play strategy choice resulting from reasoning, are supposed to remain
invariant during the whole dynamic strategic interaction. Concerning utilities,
the assumption of stable preferences of all agents throughout reasoning and play
is made explicit by the fact that they respond to the same utility function.
Concerning reasoning, our model clarifies that a game agent is presumed at his
decision node to comply with his player’s instructions i.e. to act in line with the
respective initial strategy.
The assumed stability of dynamic games implicit in the standard extensive
form model can be argued to be in tension with its inherent sequential nature.
While the latter suggests the possibility of change in dynamic games, the former
does not offer enough structure to account for any such changes. This prob-
lematic aspect of sequential stability is made explicit and can be relaxed in
our framework. In particular, the notion of high-connectedness can be formally
introduced which captures the sequential stability of game agents. Intuitively,
high-connectedness captures the idea that game agents make choices according
to the pre-play instructions of their reasoning agents. Also, Theorems 1 and
2 relate high-connectedness to backward induction reasoning. Note that high-
connectedness is a purely behavioral assumption that can be dropped locally, in
order, for instance, to account for surprise information in backward induction
reasoning. More generally, connectedness can be used to formulate hypothetical
reasoning patterns related to the sequential stability of a player and his game
agents, which in turn can be applied to epistemic characterizations of game-
theoretic solution concepts.
Moreover, by clarifying the sequential character of dynamic games, unveiling
stability assumptions and modeling reasoning about connectedness of agents,
our framework provides foundations for a realistic interpretation of dynamic
games as formal representations of strategic interaction over time. More specif-
ically, two interpretative directions can be taken. Firstly, the very sequential
structure of dynamic games as rendered transparent in our framework can be
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interpreted as temporal. Secondly, the player which is defined as a set of agents
with specific tasks in our framework can be interpreted as a person. In partic-
ular, interpretations of players in dynamic games can be linked to multiple-self
models of personal identity over time by understanding players as multiple-selves
and agents as selves. The idea of decision-makers as multiple-selves can thus be
addressed in our account of dynamic games. Indeed, the subsequent subsection
interprets dynamic games from a multiple-selves point of view.
5.2 Multiple-Self
The conception of player as a set of connected agents can naturally be linked to
the notion of connected selves in a multiple-self. Indeed, this idea of understand-
ing agents of players as the different selves of multiple-selves has been employed
in the context of extensive form models with imperfect information, such as that
of Piccione and Rubinstein (1997). Also, the idea that a player consists of differ-
ent acting selves appears in Selten (1975) and Halpern (2001) within the context
of the agent normal form. Yet such appearances of the multiple-self concept in
game theory lack philosophical foundations. Here, we propose to interpret the
notion of player as a multiple-self using theories of personal identity over time, in
order to give specific meaning to change of players over time and to the reasoning
of players about possible or observed changes of their opponents.
The notion of the multiple-self is studied in the context of theories of personal
identity over time, for instance Noonan (2003) or Raymond and Barresi (2003).
Such theories investigate how a person both persists and changes over time. The
seemingly contradictory nature of sameness and change in persons generates
two main concerns in theories of personal identity over time. Firstly, emphasis
is either given to sameness or to change of persons over time. At the extreme
ends of the spectrum, theories focus either exclusively on sameness, such as the
idea that persons are constituted by the soul which is assumed to be stable
over time, or on difference over time, such as Hume’s (1739) idea that there
is great variation between different time slices within persons. Secondly, various
criteria have been adopted to describe the substantive nature of personal identity
over time. Examples for such criteria include different psychological features, the
body, the brain, memory, emotions and consciousness.
Multiple-self theories, such as those of Parfit (1984), Elster (1986), and
Ainslie (1992), understand persons as distinct yet interconnected selves. In these
accounts, selves are capable of reasoning and acting, and are interconnected with
each other to form a multiple-self. A multiple-self model of personal identity over
time consists of three elements: a set of selves, a notion of intrapersonal connect-
edness between these selves and an interpretation of connectedness through a
criterion of personal identity over time. These models can be related to our ex-
tended epistemic framework by interpreting the agents as selves and the player
as a multiple-self. The purely behavioral notion of connectedness as measuring
compliance or deviation of a game agent with or from the initial strategy of
the reasoning agent can then be explained by underlying connectedness which
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describes the degree of continuity of psychological features, memory and sympa-
thy. Such substantive interpretations of intrapersonal connectedness render the
description of decision-makers in dynamic games more realistic. Adopting such
a multiple-self model of personal identity over time, the three substantive in-
terpretations of underlying connectedness are now considered and linked to our
extended epistemic model and sufficient conditions for backward induction.
Psychological connectedness, mainly due to Parfit (1984), measures the de-
gree of similarity between psychological traits of different selves, such as prefer-
ences. Accordingly, the temporal self is depicted as an agent acting on the basis
of his preferences. In the context of game theory, psychological connectedness
permits the interpretation of players as consisting of agents who govern decision
nodes. These agents have the capacity to act according to their possibly different
preferences. Furthermore, a supposedly irrational move at some decision node
can be interpreted as resulting from different preferences of the respective agent.
As an illustration consider the game given in Figure 1 and suppose that Bob be-
lieves Alice1 to rationally play a. Upon observing a surprising move b by Alice1,
he can make sense of the low behavioral connectedness of Alice1 as follows: Bob
adopts the belief that Alice1 has exhibited deviating preferences from her player.
In particular, it is natural to depict a breakdown in psychological connectedness
between Alice1 and Alices. However, it could also be the case that Alice1 has
re-evaluated outcomes at later terminal nodes rendering her preferences differ-
ent from Alice3. Note that a particular contemplation about what precisely has
prompted the preference change or about what precisely it consists in, is not for-
mally needed to obtain our sufficient conditions for backward induction in terms
of connectedness. Yet, in order to further describe backward induction reason-
ing, it is possible to provide such more realistic interpretations when viewing a
player as a multiple-self. In order to obtain backward induction, an agent who
observes a supposedly irrational move can hence maintain belief in the rational-
ity of the respective opponent, as well as belief in future-high-connectedness by
revising his belief in the high psychological connectedness of the deviating game
agent. Such belief revision only commits the reasoner to believing there to have
been a relevant preference change such as to prompt a local re-evaluation of the
payoffs which, in turn, has led to a local deviation from the initial strategy. Note
that similarly, Perea (2008) provides an epistemic model for dynamic games in
which the possibility of belief change about opponents’ utilities during the game
is explicitly endorsed, modeled and sufficient conditions for backward induction
are derived.
Sympathetic connectedness, such as proposed by Schechtmann (2001), mea-
sures the degree to which temporal selves can sympathize with each other. Such
a sympathetic access expresses the strength of emotional bond between selves,
supervening on physical and psychological features. In the context of game the-
ory, a supposedly irrational move at an earlier decision node can plausibly be
interpreted as a local breakdown in the opponent’s sympathetic connectedness.
By ascribing a low sympathetic connectedness to some self of another person, it is
reasonable to still grant full rationality and reasoning capacity to the remaining
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game agents and the reasoning agent of that person. Similar interpretations for
the dynamic game given in Figure 1 as proposed for psychological connectedness
are hence available.
Memory connectedness, as originally proposed by Locke (1694) and further
developed by Shoemaker and Swinburne (1984), measures the degree to which a
self remembers having had an experience at an earlier time and thus expresses
the extent of access to experiences of earlier selves. In the context of game theory,
a supposedly irrational move at an earlier decision node can be interpreted as a
breakdown of memory between the deviating agent and his player, in particular,
that the deviating agent has forgotten the initial strategy.2 related to imperfect
recall. By assigning a low access to earlier experiences of the deviating agent, a
reasoner can revise his belief in the stability of memory of an opponent, excluding
the agent from the opponent’s agents that share memories while still maintaining
belief in rationality. Similar interpretations for the game given in Figure 1 as
proposed for psychological and sympathetic connectedness are thus available.
The different interpretations of intrapersonal connectedness in the multiple-
self allow both a more fine-grained discussion of reasoning about opponents as
well as a more specific interpretation of how observed surprise moves at pre-
ceding decision nodes can be explained. Note that by adopting and combining
further criteria of personal identity over time, as reviewed by Noonan (2003) and
Raymond and Barresi (2003), various realistic accounts and interpretations of
reasoning in dynamic games are possible in our framework.
5.3 Epistemic Independence
The extended epistemic framework proposed here allows us to characterize back-
ward induction in terms of connectedness. This notion of connectedness measures
the extent to which game agents are sequentially stable relative to the reasoning
agent of the player. In Theorem 1, backward induction is assured by explaining
surprise information in terms of low-connectedness of the deviating game agent.
Connectedness reflects the fundamental principle underlying any foundation
of backward induction. This so-called principle of epistemic independence, which
is conceptually discussed by Stalnaker (1998), requires that a player treats any
information obtained during the game, such as observed opponents’ moves, as
irrelevant to his beliefs about opponents’ behavior at later points in the game.
This property is at work in our theorem: the observation of a surprising move of
an opponent’s game agent does not affect a player’s beliefs on the behavior of the
respective opponent’s future game agents, but rather the concerned game agent
is concluded to be low-connected. In other words, his comportment is regarded
as isolated and irrelevant to future behavior of the represented player.
More specifically, forward belief in future-high-connectedness yields the con-
dition of epistemic independence that is implicit in any characterization of back-
ward induction. At any decision node, forward belief in future-high-connectedness
2 Note that memory connectedness could also be used to interpret issues raised in
Piccione and Rubinstein’s (1997).
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ensures the stability of all game agents at all succeeding decision nodes even if
game agents at preceding decision nodes have been deviating from the initial
strategy of their reasoning agent. Note that in our framework surprise informa-
tion precisely consists in deviation from the initial strategy. Epistemic indepen-
dence is assured by forward belief in future-high-connectedness which, in turn,
leads to a behavioral isolation of any surprise information.
In a general sense, note that there is a tension between the sequential sta-
bility implicitly assumed to underlie standard accounts of dynamic games and
some local breakdown which is needed for epistemic independence. This ten-
sion needs to be accounted for in any epistemic characterization of backward
induction. In our framework, the notion of connectedness is used to describe this
tension: low-connectedness makes explicit the idea that the sequential stability
of the initial strategy can break down locally, while forward belief in future-high-
connectedness ensures that the effects of such a breakdown indeed remain local.
Connectedness thus makes explicit the crucial rigidity with which epistemic in-
dependence requires local breakdowns of sequential stability to be treated.
The multiple-self interpretation introduced above yields further insights into
the fundamental principle of epistemic independence. In dynamic games, it is
natural to depict a player as a multiple-self whose selves are highly connected
on all interpretations of underlying connectedness, i.e. selves highly connected
in terms of psychological features, memory and sympathy. Upon receiving sur-
prise information, belief revision according to forward belief in future-high-
connectedness sets the behavioral connectedness of the deviating opponent game
agent to low. It is then plausible to claim that this low behavioral connectedness
stems from some breakdown in underlying connectedness. However, forward be-
lief in future-high-connectedness also ensures that any succeeding game agents of
the respective opponent are assumed to be entirely unaffected by the deviating
behavior of the particular preceding supposedly low-connected agent under any
interpretation of underlying connectedness, such as psychological, sympathetic
and memory connectedness. Hence, forward belief in future-high-connectedness
reveals that foundations for backward induction have commonly been tacitly
assuming a much stronger epistemic independence assumption. Indeed, forward
belief in future-high-connectedness is required for any underlying connectedness.
Note that assuming such epistemic independence with regards to any underlying
connectedness is considerably strong, due to the latter’s philosophical founda-
tions. Again, this suggests that the assumption of epistemic independence is
much stronger than commonly assumed.
Farther, our framework is capable of clarifying Aumann’s (1995) epistemic
conditions for backward induction. In his framework, Aumann uses an entirely
static epistemic operator that refers to the beginning of the game. Once fixed, the
epistemic state of a player concerns a single point in time and does not change.
It is hence difficult to account for belief revision in this framework. However,
Aumann’s key nested epistemic notion of common knowledge of rationality can
be interpreted as being equivalent to our concept of common structural belief
in rationality. Indeed, rationality refers to a player’s initial strategy fixed before
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the game and rigidity of a belief in a rational initial strategy is thus possible to
entertain in our model. However, the belief in the actual choice of the opponents
may change at different points in the game. It can hence be claimed that Aumann
implicitly endorses some kind of high-connectedness assumption, requiring it to
be common knowledge that a player never actually changes his intended initial
strategy. This implicit assumption is explicated by our forward belief in future-
high-connectedness condition. By understanding strategies as intentions or, more
precisely, initial strategies, Aumann is able to obtain backward induction with
an entirely static epistemic operator.
5.4 Backward Induction Paradoxes
The so-called backward induction paradoxes have been addressed by, for in-
stance, Selten (1978), Rosenthal (1981) as well as Binmore (1987), and identify
games in which backward inductive reasoning leads to rather implausible and
counterintuitive strategy choices. In this context, a crucial argument against the
plausibility of backward induction criticizes that the reasoning method does not
take into account any observed past behavior at all, even when the backward in-
ductive strategy profile is contradicted during actual play. In fact, our framework
can be used to juxtapose belief revision patterns in line with such a plausibil-
ity requirement, and to contrast them to belief revision policies sufficient for
backward induction reasoning according to Theorem 1. Recall that the latter
belief revision policies require a player to set the connectedness of a deviating
agent to low and to maintain belief in the high-connectedness of each of the
opponent’s future agents. In contrast, belief revision policies in line with the
plausibility requirement set the connectedness of all future game agents of the
relevant opponent to low upon observing an opponent game agent deviate. Thus,
the intuition is captured that the respective game agents actually play a strategy
different from the initial strategy believed to be chosen by their reasoning agent.
As an illustration of this comparison between these two kinds of belief revi-
sion policies for dynamic games with perfect information, consider the dynamic
game given in Figure 1. Suppose Bob reasons in line with the conditions of The-
orem 1 and hence in line with backward induction. In case of him surprisingly
observing Alice1 to choose b, he sets her connectedness to Alice’s reasoning agent
to low, while keeping his belief in the high-connectedness of Alice’s future game
agent Alice3. Alternatively, suppose now that Bob when observing Alice1’s de-
viating move still believes that Alice’s reasoning agent has chosen the backward
inductive strategy as initial strategy, but that the game agents play a strategy
different from the initial strategy. He thus also sets the connectedness between
Alice3 and Alice’s reasoning agent to low. Note that he is free to believe what
Alice3 will choose. For instance, if he believes that she will pick e, then he can
only optimally select c at his decision node.
We now focus on Rosenthal’s (1981) approach to the backward induction
paradoxes. On his account, small probabilities of future deviating moves are
introduced into dynamic games and interpreted as the players’ intersubjective
beliefs about future moves of opponents. In our framework, such probabilities
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can be elucidated by introducing a more fine-grained belief revision on devi-
ating moves. More precisely, we introduce probabilistic beliefs on how likely
it is that opponent game agents deviate from their respective initial strategy.
These probabilistic beliefs are updated by a player’s belief about the underlying
connectedness of an opponent, which in turn depends on his beliefs on the oppo-
nent’s behavioral connectedness. Recall that underlying connectedness describes
the degree of continuity of psychological features, memory and sympathy in a
multiple-self.
A player could form probabilistic beliefs on future deviating moves of an op-
ponent as follows. Firstly, suppose a player observes a move by an opponent agent
that deviated from his respective initial strategy and explains it with the latter’s
low behavioral connectedness. Note that this low behavioral connectedness can
be treated as information about the opponent. Secondly, suppose further that
a player has a belief about the underlying connectedness of the opponent’s per-
son. It is then natural to update these beliefs with the behavioral observation.
In other words, players can learn about their opponent’s character during the
game. Thirdly, also suppose that a player entertains beliefs about his opponents’
future behavior. Then, it seems reasonable to update the latter beliefs with his
beliefs about the respective opponent’s underlying connectedness.
Let a specific underlying connectedness be assigned to any pair of agents in a
player: c : i× i→ {high, low}, where a player i is conceived of as a set of agents
according to Definition 3. Such an underlying connectedness function can be
interpreted as an opponent’s belief about the connectedness between any pair of
agents in a player. For instance, within the context of the game given in Figure 1,
starting with a natural belief in high-connectedness from sequential stability as
well as a belief that Alice’s initial strategy is the backward inductive one, upon
observing that Alice1 chooses b, backward induction can only be behaviorally
maintained for Bob by updating his belief about Alice’s underlying connect-
edness function as follows: set the connectedness of any pair of Alice’s agents
involving Alice1 to low, i.e. c(Alices, Alice1) = low, c(Alicer, Alice1) = low,
c(Alice1, Alice3) = low, c(Alice1, Alices) = low, c(Alice1, Alicer) = low, and
c(Alice3, Alice1) = low, while maintaining the belief in the high connectedness
between any two other agents, i.e. c(Alices, Alicer) = high, c(Alices, Alice3) =
high, c(Alicer, Alice3) = high, c(Alicer, Alices) = high, c(Alice3, Alices) = high,
and c(Alice3, Alicer) = high. Clearly, such a belief revision policy is implausible:
believing that Alice1 is low-connected to all other agents while still preserv-
ing belief in the high-connectedness between all other pairs of agents seems to
completely deny any relevance of Alice1 with regards to Alice as a multiple-self.
Consider a more fine-grained underlying connectedness function expressing
degrees of connectedness of pairs of agents, namely c : i×i→ [0, 1]. Such degrees
can be natural in the context of interpretations of connectedness from theories
of personal identity over time. For example, according to psychological connect-
edness, each agent could be interpreted as a set of preferences. The degree of
connectedness then measures the rate of preference change. Similarly, memory
connectedness can be seen as a matter of degrees rather than binary. Interpreting
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the more-fine grained connectedness function c with theories of personal iden-
tity over time further illustrates that backward induction can be argued to be
very demanding in terms of maintaining beliefs in high-connectedness of future
game agents of opponents. Using such a more fine-grained underlying connect-
edness function, the following belief revision upon receiving surprise information
seems plausible. The supposedly low behavioral connectedness of the deviating
game agent Alice1 induces Bob to believe that there is some agent of Alice
to which Alice1’s connectedness is strictly less than 1. In other words, some
failure of the underlying connectedness has to be assumed in order to explain
the low behavioral connectedness. Then, such revised beliefs in an underlying
connectedness function can be used to update beliefs about future moves of an
opponent. More specifically, underlying connectedness can determine a player’s
probabilistic beliefs about how likely an opponent game agent will deviate from
the initial strategy at future nodes. Conditionalizing on the fact there is some
agent of Alice to which Alice1’s connectedness is strictly less than 1, plausible
updating rules render Bob’s probabilistic beliefs in future deviation of any of
Alice’s game agents strictly positive, since each agent has some relevance to his
respective player as a multiple-self. Intuitively, upon believing that there is at
least some agent-pair in an opponent which is not perfectly connected, the re-
spective player’s belief about the future deviation of his opponent’s game agents
will be strictly positive, as future game agents may also be disposed to deviate
from the reasoning agent’s initial strategy as exhibited by the particular game
agent that has already deviated.
Further plausible constraints on such updating patterns can be introduced.
For instance, it is possible that under the interpretation of psychological con-
nectedness, the underlying connectedness changes more drastically than under
the interpretation of memory connectedness. Consider a preference change of one
game agent whose psychological connectedness is thus low. If all other agents’
preferences remain stable, then there will be a low-connectedness between the
respective game agent and all other agents. However, in the context of memory
connectedness, it could be the case that one game agent has forgotten the initial
strategy, while all other agents still remember the initial strategy well. There-
fore, it is at least plausible to require monotonicity to be respected in updating
beliefs about future deviation for psychological connectedness. With different in-
terpretations, the breakdown of connectedness can be more or less wide in scope
in terms of how many agents are affected. Which or whether all of these inter-
pretations are endorsed depends on how realistic a model of the decision-maker
is intended.
In our framework, it can thus be argued that backward induction reasoning
is implausible, when underlying connectedness is interpreted as a belief about
the opponent’s character and probabilistic beliefs about future deviation of op-
ponents are updated on the basis of beliefs about underlying connectedness.
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5.5 Trembling Hand
It is possible to interpret Selten’s (1975) idea of a perturbed game with con-
nectedness as understood in our framework in a natural way. The claim that a
deviating move is due to the respective player exhibiting a trembling hand, and
thus making a slight mistake by picking an irrational action with small prob-
ability, can be expressed and explained in our model. The agents of a player
are assumed to be highly connected and play in line with the initial strategy
with almost certainty, yet with small probability their underlying connectedness
is low and subsequent behavior deviates. In other words, a given game agent
might - despite it being assumed to be very unlikely - tremble in implementing
the intended initial strategy of his player’s reasoning agent. Such trembles can
be used as explanations for observed deviations from an opponent’s supposed
initial strategy in belief revision policies. More precisely, whenever a player who
believes in the high-connectedness of the game agents of each of his opponents
is surprised by a move of a game agent which contradicts the initial strategy
he believes the respective opponent’s reasoning agent to have chosen, he can
then separate that game agent. Indeed he can only assign low-connectedness to
that particular game agent, while keeping fixed the high-connectedness of the
respective opponent’s other game agents. Such isolated behavior of this given
deviating game agent is explained as a mistake on the agent’s part.
Note that such a specific trembling hand vindication of deviating behavior
corresponds to a particular belief concerning the underlying connectedness of the
relevant game agent. Intuitively, the trembling hand is a physical metaphor for
the failure to complete a given task, despite having had appropriate dispositions
to perform it. In terms of underlying connectedness, it is possible to interpret
a trembling hand with low sympathetic connectedness, while at the same time
psychological as well as memory connectedness are high. Hence, the deviating
game agent is now supposed to be lowly connected to the player as a multiple-self:
even though he has the same preferences and perfect memory, he somehow slips
and makes a mistake. Note that such belief revision policies are close to the ones
sufficient for backward induction and far from the supposedly more plausible
ones with regards to the backward induction paradoxes in terms of their general
intuition. Lexicographically speaking, whenever a surprise move of some game
agent contradicting the supposed initial strategy of his respective reasoning agent
is observed, the state in which the deviating agent is lowly connected and others
are highly connected is deemed infinitely more likely than the state where the
player’s future agents are also lowly connected to the respective player. The
key to the construction and comparisons of such belief patterns is our notion of
initial strategy, which can be contrasted with the same player’s actual strategy,
and hence belief about initial choice can be juxtaposed with belief about actual
choice.
As an illustration of the idea of a trembling hand in the context of our
framework, consider the dynamic game given in Figure 1. Suppose Bob initially
believes all game agents of Alice to be high-connected and at Bob2 that Alice’s
initial strategy is backward inductive one af . However, at Bob2 he then has
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has to accommodate the surprise information that Alice1 has actually chosen
b. Explaining this deviating behavior with an exceptional mistake incurred by
Alice1 in implementing Alicer’s plan, Bob sets the connectedness of game agent
Alice1 to low, yet preserves his belief in the high-connectedness of Alice’s future
game agent Alice3. His unique optimal choice is hence given by d.
6 Conclusion
By rendering transparent relevant yet usually neglected processes linked to dy-
namic games we clarify their inherent dynamics. We analyze the sequential struc-
ture of dynamic games with a three-stage account, which defines player and
strategy relative to these dynamic stages. A sequential stability assumption un-
derlying the standard extensive form model of dynamic games is made explicit in
our account. To describe reasoning in dynamic games, a more general epistemic
model is proposed that is capable of formalizing the notion of agent connected-
ness. Such an enriched framework sheds light on backward induction reasoning.
Formally, we provide sufficient conditions for backward induction in terms of con-
nectedness. Conceptually, the essence of backward induction can be explicated,
since surprise information is explained with low-connectedness of the deviating
agent. Also, the epistemic independence assumption underlying any foundation
of backward induction can be shown to be considerably stronger than usually
assumed. Our framework makes explicit that any underlying connectedness of
players as multiple-selves has tacitly been assumed to be high.
In a general sense, our frameworks provides adequate foundations for inter-
preting the sequential structure of dynamic games in temporal terms. In partic-
ular, defining a player as a set of agents enables a more realistic interpretation
of decision-makers in dynamic games. Using the multiple-self model of personal
identity over time also provides richer descriptions of players, for instance, with
regards to psychological, sympathetic and memory connectedness. Hence, our
framework is especially relevant for the social sciences, where players should be
interpreted as persons existing over time.
Finally, the framework proposed here could also be employed to shed light
on the sequential structure and dynamics of games of imperfect information as
well as to to clarify corresponding reasoning and solution concepts. It would be
of particular interest to search for sequential stability requirements for forward
induction reasoning in terms of agent connectedness. Intuitively, actual choice
of a game agent should then be believed to be highly relevant to actual choice
of the respective player’s future game agents.
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